Political scandal is a major part of the political landscape and has been the subject of extensive study in several disciplines, especially politics and communication studies. However, much of this research suffers from conceptual and methodological weaknesses. Moreover, empirical results are inconsistent and difficult to generalize. This article seeks to address these shortcomings and to provide a roadmap for future research on the topic.
A central premise of this article is that political scandals result from the interaction between two processes: a public disclosure of wrongdoing and a political decision to make that public disclosure. The decision to expose the wrongdoing is based on a political evaluation of benefits and costs and involves balancing risks against the public interest. The outcome of this decision depends on the type of scandal and the political system and media culture.
Often, political decisions to expose scandalous behavior are driven by strategic motivations of those in power. In particular, politicians may stage scandals to influence media agendas and smear competitors. This article shows that the political manipulation of what is framed as a scandal can have serious consequences for voters and society.
Furthermore, the decision to disclose scandalous information is based on the underlying belief that the press plays a key role in democracy by scrutinizing legislative, executive, and judicial powers on behalf of citizens (Ettema & Glasser, 1988). As a result, news organizations are often seen as an unofficial fourth branch of government and their ability to uncover norm transgressions and circumstances that could be perceived as a scandal is essential to democratic accountability. Experimental findings support this notion.